



Spring Term 2026 (FS 2026)

**Doctoral Seminar
« Strategic Communication »**

Course schedule and reading list

1) Session schedule

Session	Day	Time	Location
1	Monday, 27.4.2026	10:00 – 11:30	PLM-F-103/104
2	Monday, 27.4.2026	12:45 – 14:15	PLM-F-103/104
3	Monday, 27.4.2026	14:30 – 16:00	PLM-F-103/104
4	Tuesday, 28.4.2026	10:00 – 11:30	PLM-F-103/104
5	Tuesday, 28.4.2026	14:00 – 15:30	PLM-F-103/104
Research Seminar	Tuesday, 28.4.2026	16:15 – 17:45	PLM-F-103/104
6	Wednesday, 29.4.2026	10:00 – 11:30	PLM-F-103/104
7	Wednesday, 29.4.2026	12:45 – 14:15	PLM-F-103/104
8	Wednesday, 29.4.2026	14:30 – 16:00	PLM-F-103/104

On Tuesday, 28.4.2026, 16:15-17:45 Professor Einhorn will present her latest research paper in the Department's Research Seminar in Accounting, Auditing & Governance (AAG). The talk is considered as a part of the doctoral seminar, see:

<https://www.business.uzh.ch/de/research/professorships/managerialaccounting/lehre/aag.html>

2) Seminar content and reading list

Session 1: Fundamentals

No communication of non-verifiable information

- Akerlof, G. (1970). The market for 'lemons': Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 84, 488-500.

Perfect communication of verifiable information

- Viscusi, W.K. (1979). A note on "lemons" markets with quality certification. *Bell Journal of Economics*, 9, 277-279.
- Grossman, S.J. (1981). The informational role of warranties and private disclosure about product quality. *Journal of Law and Economics*, 24, 460-483.
- Milgrom, P. (1981). Good news and bad news: Representation theorems and applications. *Bell Journal of Economics*, 12, 380-391.



Session 2, 3, 4: Imperfect communication of verifiable information

- Jovanovic, B. (1982). Truthful disclosure of information. *Bell Journal of Economics*, 13, 36-44.
- Verrecchia, R. E. (1983). Discretionary disclosure. *Journal of Accounting and Economics*, 5, 179-194.
- Dye, R.A. (1985). Disclosure of nonproprietary information. *Journal of Accounting Research*, 23, 123-145.
- Jung, W.O., & Kwon, Y.K. (1988). Disclosure when the market is unsure of information endowment of managers. *Journal of Accounting Research*, 26, 146-153.
- Einhorn, E. (2007). Voluntary disclosure under uncertainty about the reporting objective. *Journal of Accounting and Economics*, 43, 245-274.

Session 5, 6: Imperfect communication of partially verifiable information

- Stein, J.C. (1989). Efficient capital markets, inefficient firm: A model of myopic corporate behavior. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 104, 655-669.
- Fischer, P.E., & Verrecchia, R.E. (2000). Reporting bias. *The Accounting Review*, 75, 229-245.
- Einhorn, E., & Ziv, A. (2012) Biased voluntary disclosures. *Review of Accounting Studies*, 17, 420-442.

Session 7, 8: Imperfect communication of non-verifiable information

- Crawford, V.P., & Sobel, J. (1982). Strategic information transmission. *Econometrica*, 50, 1431-1451.
- Morgan, J., & Stocken, P.C. (2003). An analysis of stock recommendations. *RAND Journal of Economics*, 34, 183-203.
- Einhorn, E., (2018) Competing information sources. *The Accounting Review*, 93, 151-176.

3) Exam

Grading is based on a take-home assignment (3 ECTS).